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Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "The Preparation and Use of Strategic Reserves In the Second Worldy Colonel A. Grylcv. This article appeared In1pecial vorsion of the Soviet Journal Military Thought which" Is classified SECRET by the Soviets and la published irregularly.
was sent to pressecember
Military Thought Is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense"in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, AND TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is issued monthly and has existed The SECRET version is issued Irregularly. By the end1 Issues had been published,f them during Tbe TOP SECRET version was initiated in0 and is also Issued irregularly.
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION The Preparation and Use of Strategic Reserves
in the Second World War by
Colonel A. Grylev
ticular the direct >rld War and of has convincingly
Soviet military-working out the reserves.
The experience of all warfare, and ln par experience of the Russian army in thehe Soviethe civil war In tho USSR, demonstrated the significance of reserves. For this reason,
in the period preceding the Second World War, theoretical thought devoted much attention to problem of the creation and use of strategic,
part of combined-arms large units, but intended for the reinforcement of the
on the operational and tactical missions beinn
fulfilled by them.
he war he war -Command
In the pre-warreat deal of work' was done in our country on the creation of strategic reserves. This wasln the practical measures adopted by trie Soviet command on the eve of the war. The existing estimates for strategic deployment of our armed forces called for the creation of five armies in the High Command Reserve - the h, h, d,hh. hh Armies were destined for theaxis andd for the western, andhh were to constitute the central reserve of the Ugh Command, locatod northwest and southwest of Moscow, just before
2Z anu soutnwest of Moscow, just before
It*yery beginning of t
tne *ath Army, which were also included ln thelHigheserve. Thus, at the very beginning of tite war there were eight armies under the direct orders of the High Command, consisting
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iSONBASK]
divisions ifle, ank, otorized).
of these troops was
To rather
of
be sure, the combat effectiveness
had few tanks and little artillery, and were
he rifle divisions were at their cutback peacetime strength, while most of the tank and motorized divisions of the mechanized corps had still not completed their formation
weakly knit.
emphasized.
Central reached Reserve was put Defense Marshal
One very important circumstance should Just before the beginning of the war, the Politburo of the
the decision to unite the armies ofingle command. Onuneirective of the People's Commissariat ofroup of armies under the command of Union S. M. Budennyy.
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
the High Command
of
this decision
Thus, at tho
the Soviet
was not organically
very start of thoowerful formation of strategic reserves had already been created, which committedront.
the reserve of
Inshould point out that me reserve oi
thehad onlyivisions, of which
erearmy groupsCenter",
specially formed units eve of the war was consider-High Command Reserve was the experience of the First
Our situation with regard to (formirovaniye) of the ROK on the ably worse. The artillery of the very small in number, even though
breach su
As for before ten engineer
World War had shown that the RGK must have strong artillery. At the start of the Second World War we had an the RGKun regiments.owitzer regiments,eparate battalions,eparate batteries. They6 artillery pieces, orercent of the over-all number of such weapons in the Soviet Army. Howitzer systems predomina ;ed in the artillery of the RGK and were intended for ensuring tho
of the enemy's dofense, but gun artil ery was in short supply and antiaircraft artillery was completely lacking.
units of the RGK consisted of Lfl
the antitank artillery of the RGK, itlwas only Just the war (inhat the formation was begun of antitank brigades (with two regiments injcach^. The
engineer regiments.
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3talions and far below st ength and were
Tank and absent from
ontoon-bridging regiments, one company- Those units were very poorly supplied with engineer equipmen aviation units and large units were completely the High Command Reserve.
forma ions
of the High Command *ore transferred as
which were the specially
beginning of the war
reinforcement for tne troops in tho military districts. The cistribution of the existing artillery and engineer units of the RGK at the
in the Bai tic. Vfest-
represented,on theituation
were
Ln which the overwhelming mass of thee ern, and Kiev Border Districts.
their use. These can be seen in the
Once the war began. It introduced great changes both in the preparation of the strategic reserves and ln theplans following:
ot for a
the troops of the border districtsnable to perform the task assigned tob repel the enemy attack, to halt his advance, and to create the conditions for our armed forces t6 go over to the offensive. For this reason it to use the existing strategic reserve Joint offensive with the troops of the western border districts- as had been planned.fbut for defense;
in the first days of the war it became clear that the enemy had concentrated his main efforts on the western axis,ery difficult situation was created for our troops. All the strategic reserves were therefore redirected onto this axis. This required, specif lcally, the rapid transfer to tbe western axis ofhhich bad earlier been moved into the Ukraine:
that to perform loft. There
by the end of1 it was alreadj the Western Front was in no condition its tasks with tho forces which it h
fore,t, and
4-
elidovo-
had been Yelnya-Zhukovka
+torP?rated into this front, which brought about the liquidation of the army group of tbe High Command Reserve. Consequently, already at he beginning of July, the High Command hadrders only two armiesh moved up to the line
serious units under ack of tank Headquarters conduct of
--at the
very beginning of the war
i*5eand engineer the RGK began to be felt, and the 1aircraft reserves of General Ibtavka) greatly complicated the irmed combat.
complex task -
as drawing
them from the
but such methods of creating(rOB the Far Astern,
our
State Party.
taskVast and ^credibly difficult
experienced Coaounisr
nPnnll " tht
people, as led by the
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1
jlJlON3AgKJ
First of all, the large-scale buildup of rifle troops was begun. On1 the decision had already been taken for the supplementary formation ofifle divisionsi? th8reecision to formifle divisions andivisions of people's militia (narodnoyo opolchenlye) and onugust, still anotherifle divisions. The formation also beganargo number of cavalry largo units (from July to avalry divisions were formed). The establishment of new amy commands took place simultaneously. uly ommands of combined-arms armies were newly created in the Ceneral Headquarters reserve andrmies directly within fronts. To
n eriod, however. rmy commands were aisoandea.
In connection with the growing need for command personnel urgent measures were adopted for their training: tho system i training institutions and courses was broadened and the number of those in training was increased. But these could produce results only in the future. Meanwhile, for thesatisfaction of the need for command personnel it was decided to disband the rifle corps commands. To fulfil the need for combat equipment and arms, literally all possibilities models5 the issuance to the troops of obsolete
Quito naturally, the builduparge number of formations and large unitshort period could not help
"fleet on their quality. Manyunits were dispatched to the front inadequately organized and armed. Because of the need for tho rapid commitment of large units to the army wereonsiderableof rifle and ski brigades
The war demonstrated that infantry on the defensive, and even more on the offensive, was in need of tanks designated for its direct support(NPP). But, there were no such tanks, either within the rifle large units or in the separate tank units of the RGK. In connection with this, the formation was begun of separate tank brigades and battalions of the RGK. Ior the mechanized corps, they were liquidated in July
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jl BON BASK
For the support of army missiles- in an army, besides the ground means of reconnaissance, there should be means for air reconnaissance; including aircraft, helicopters and pilotless means. ront, in addition toand artillery-fire-direction aircraft, it is necessary to have pilotless means of reconnaissance.
The need for specially trained air reconnaissance subunits underhe commander of the missile troops and artilleryrontith apparatus for the determination of the coordinates of targets, is confirmed by the experience of exercises. On one of these, for example,bjectives mere reconnoitered by tho forcesront; but their coordinates, which only artillery-fire-direction aircraft could provide, were determined for onlybjectives.
undamental solution of the questions of combat with the nuclear means cf the en*my: it is necessary to provide the commanders of missile troops and artilleryront and an army and also the divisional level with reliable means for reconnaissance and destruction. We should note- incidentally, that during World War II all the necessary means for reconnaissance and destruction were under the orders of the artillery commander and that, thanks to this, counter-battery combat wasontinuous nature,
As has been pointed out above, various forces and means, from the complement of all arras of troops, will be brought ln to the combat with the nuclear means of the enemy. The effective use of all these means is inconceivable without well-organized, operational and efficiently functioning control at all levels, beginning from the planning and ending with the actual assignment of missions to the means of reconnaissance and destruction, and also checking on their timely completion-The responsibility for organizing combat with nuclear means rests with the commander of the troopsront (army), and the commanderivision
|IRQN8Afl<
Control of the means of destructionront or in an army is carried out in accordance with the plan of combat against the enemy's nuclear weapons- This plan is worked out under the direction of the chief of staff of the front (army) by the operations and reconnaissance directorates together ,with the staffs of ths missile troops and artillery and of the air army. In the plan the following questions should be reflected:
-the grouping of the enemy troops, especially of his nuclear means;
-the limit of ammunition with nuclear, chemical and conventional fillers planned for use in combat with the enemy's nuclear means and their distribution by tasks (days) of an operation and by armies;
-the limit of the flying resources of the aviation and their distribution;
-the position of the reconnaissance units and sub-units and of the means of destruction brought in for combat with the enemy's nuclear means;
-taeks of the combat with the enemy's nuclear means which are entrustedront, to an army andivision;
-the distribution of these tasks between the different means for reconnaissance and destruction;
-the arrangement for the movement of means during the course of the operation;
-the tasks of the combined arms (especially tank) large units and formations in the destruction of the means of nuclear attack and in the disruption of the basing of nuclear weapons along the axis of the main strike;
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-the organization of control of the means which have been brought in (the organization of communications, signals, call signs,etc).
The plan may be represented graphicallyap or written.
It is quite clear that combat with the enemy's nuclear means must be waged continuously both in the preparatory period of an operation, and while it is being conducted. However, the most vigorous operations of the main mass of means for reconnaissance and destruction, will clearly be timed for certain moments of the operation, when the most crucial tasks are being performed, such as the commitment to battle of the second echelons, the repulse ofthe forcing of water obstacles etc.
The plan for radio counter-measures evolved by the operations directorate should be drawn up with regard to the requirements for combat with the enemy's nuclear means. Support for this combat must be planned and carried out in the first instance.
The movement of the whole complex of means during the course of an operation must be planned onasis as to ensure the constant readiness of the latter to perform tasks at any time of the day or night and under any circumstances.
The -commander of the missile troops and artilleryront must be the principal organizer of the employment of the missile troops of the front in combat with the enemy's
nuclear means. On the basis of the plan drawn up by the
staff of the front, he, with his staff, worksll the questions connected with the organization of the combat
of the front's missile troops with the enemy's nuclear means,
reflecting them in an appropriate plan.
The role of the commander and staff of the missile troops and artillery in the planning and organization of theof duty missile subunits, whose basic function is the destruction of the enemy's nuclear means, is especially As is generally known, the duty missile batteries
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3
which are on launch sites,tate of readiness totrike in relatively short periods, namely the duty batteries under the command of the commander of missile troops and artillery, are the means with whose help the latter can most quickly deliver strikes against objectives which have been exposed.
In planning the operations of the duty batteries, the commander of the missile troops and artilleryront (army) determines their number, the units and subunits, from which they should be detached, the number of nuclear warheads, and the procedure for their preparation and supply the organization of communications,etc.
The commander of the artillery of a' division must plan, in detail, the useattalion of tactical missiles and tube artillery, both* for combat with the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons, and for combat with his artilleryhole.
At the present time, when an army operateside zone and its divisions carry on combat operationsonsiderable distance from one another, combat with tactical nuclear means and artillery can most successfully be performed only in the divisions. This isivision must be providedufficient quantity of artillery, especially with long-range artillery, and also with reconnaissance rc^ans, which wereabove.
An axnyront, with the missile units, as we already said, will carry on the combat with the enemy's nuclear means which are disposed in the rear and will also supplement the fire of battalions of tactical missiles and of divisional artillery against tactical weapons. In conformity with this, the functions of the commanders of the missile troops and artilleryront and of an army and of the commander of the artilleryivision are determined. They mustoperationally exclusively to the Incoming data on enemy nuclear means which have been exposed, make decisions and quickly give the necessary commands to open fire.
1
The system for the control of the means ofthe missile troops and artillery, under the commandertroops and artillery must be similar to theset up in thetroops.
At the command posts of the commanders of missile troops and artillery, reconnaissance data should be quickly plottedire control map or on an appropriate artillery board and the command to open fire should be transmittedspending only several seconds in all on this.
The command posts of commanders of missile troops and artillery of missile brigades, battalions and batteries should be equipped with electronic computers and with different calculators and the means of communications between them must provide dependable, fast and enciphered transmission ofand commands. Unfortunately, for the moment there are no such
In order to be ready to carry out the tasks of combat with the enemy's nuclear means, already, today, the staffs of the commanders of missile troops and artillery must beosition to set up two fire control groups,umber of well-prepared and trained officers- Control groups should be supplied with well-equipped mobile command posts, provided with all the necessary instruments, appliances, selective communications, and other means of light automation.
In order that the appropriate instructions and commands for the destruction of objectives may pass without obstruction, it is essentialpecial channel of communications should be allocated between staffsront, an army,ivision, and also that measures necessary for the granting of special priorities in the use of all lines of communications should be envisaged, up to the automatic disconnection of any subscribers and the clearinghannel of communications for the time of the transmissionommand. Channels of communications must be dependably paralleled by different means of communications assigned fo^ the dfrection of the fire of the missile troopsront, an army,ivision.
It Is necessary to determine in detail the operatine procedure at ail levels of the system for control of the means of combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons, for the Maintenance of comiaands (instructions; for appropriate documentation etc, and to .Improve this system daily, as is done in the fire control of the missile troops and artillery.
a
minutes
At the present time an unceasing struggle is being waged in the missile troops and artillery to shorten the time for the preparation of nuclear strikes along the wholerom the commander of the missile troopsront to tho launch sites. Work on the shortening of time is carried on in all brancheshe implementationeries of technical decisions, the training of theof staffs at all levels by systematic instruction, an increase in efficiency within each staff, especiallyamon generals and officers who are being brought directly to the control of fire; the equipment of working areas and of the personnel of control groups with different Instruments and appliances; the setting up of special control machines; the introduction of selective communications; the use ofbrief, laconic commands and instructions with the use of codes which are simple to use but sufficiently reliable. The work which has beon done has already yielded positive results. Thus, on one of the exercises, from the moment when the task ofuclear strike was received by the commander of the missile troops and artillery of front o the launch ofissile, fromoere used, which included the preparation of the missile for firing .
However, athortening of time has been achieved in only one portion of the whole systom of controlimes as long was used for its other portionrom the moment of detection of the target by reconnaissance to the makingecision by the commander of the troopsront (army) .
Consequently, it is necessary to turn'our attention to coordination of the whole system of control beginning from the staffront(army) and ending with the immediate ex
ecutors. An assessment of the operation of this system oust be considered as an important element in the overall assessment of the training of the staffs of fronts, armies and divisions. It would be quite reasonable, in the near future, topecial irant-al or instruction on the operation of this-systempecial complex of typical missions to test the ability of staffs to carry outcombat with the enemy's nuclear means.
Such, in the main, are the problems of the organization of combat with nuclear means which, in our opinion, must be resolved by the missile troops and artillery.
We also consider It necessary to dwell briefly on the problems of other arms of troops in combat with nuclear means, since the missile troops and artillery carry on this combat in close coordination with then, in the first place with aviation, and with the tank and airborne troops.
An important role ln the combat with the enemy's nuclear means oust be played by aircraft, whose advantage lies ln its ability to carry on the struggle with nuclear means which are on the move most effectively. In the course of an the enemy's nuclear means, like our missile units and subunits, will be on the mo-'e foroercent of the time, not only at night, but also in the daytime, whencan operate most successfully. Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind, thateriod of movement the enemy's nuclear means can be detected considerably more quickly than they can in well-camouflaged siting aroas or build-up areas. In these periods, aviation must display its maximum powers in the combat with the enemy's nuclear means.
The weaknesses of aviation are its dependence on meteorological conditions and its vulnerability to the enemy's antlair defenses. With proper organizational coordination between missile troops and aviation, one can use theof each of these means, taking account of andtheir shortcomings.
1
The antiair defense troops of tho ground troops should also be used In the overall system of combat with nuclear means. First of all, they can destroy the aircraft of the onemy's reconnaissance aviation. The main task of the antiair defense troops will be the destruction of delivery aircraft for nuclear bombs and cruise-missiles. The question of the development of complexes which would be able to carry on thewith the enemy's missiles in their flight trajectory already exists. These complexes are an important means for combat with the ervtemy's nuclear weapons.
Besides the missile troops, artillery, aviation, and antiair defense troops, other forces and means which are under the ordersront and an army, -tank and airborne troops, diversionary-reconnaissance groups and radio^technicalhould be drawn into the combat with the enemy's nuclear means.
The experience of the Second World War shows that during actions in the operational areas.tank troops frequently destroyed the enemy's artillery on the march or in build-up areas, seized or destroyed munitions depots, etc. odern war there will be considerably morefor actions by tank troops in the enemy's operational rear. In all cases, ore of the missions of the
tank troops should be the destruction of the enemy's nuclear means.
In the course of combat operations, tank troops may carry on the fight with atomic artillery, guided missiles, and free rockets at sites, in build-up areas and on the march, destroying both personnel and materiel in the Operating in the operational rear, tanks are also capable of disrupting the support system of special types of weapons, of destroying depots, command posts and others.
For combat with the enemy's nuclear means it Is also necessary to use airborne troops- Si/rely,odern operation, together with the seizure of individual areas
planning
of an operation,the actions by airborne troops, assigned to combat with the enemy's nuclear means, should bewith the operations of other means of destruction and in the first instance, with the operations of the missile troops, of"aviation, and of tanks.
The operations of diversionary-reconnaissance groups can be of definite significance in the combat with the enemy's nuclear means. These groups can operate with particular success along the routes for the supply of missiles and nuclear charges from depots and assembly bases to units and subunits. Operating from ambush or making raids on the transports carrying missiles or nuclear charges, diversionary-reconnaissance groups can inflictdamage. An attack by diversionary-reconnaissance groupsosition of the enemy's nuclear means, is also entirely feasible. Here it is expedient to attack the most vulnerable elementsombat formation, on which theeffectiveness of the whole unit or subunlt is dependent. For example,Corporal" battery, it is sufficient to knock the radar guidance station out of action,and thewill be unable to undertake the launchingissile.
Finally, radio-technical means should be widely used in the combat with the enemy's nuclear means. They can befor this purpose in two ways: for intelligence on the enemy's radio-technical moans and for the creation ofin the operation of the enemy's radio and radar By the skilful use of radio-technical means, ln combination with other means for reconnaissance andone can achieve sufficiently effective results.
Only some of the questions of combat with the enemy's nuclear means have been touched upon in the present article. Since this struggleost important problem, its solution calls for great efforts by all arms of troops and, in the first instance, by the missile troops, aviation,and artillery. The military academies, the scientific-fosearch institutes, and the troops must join in to solve this problem. Only by theirefforts can it be resolved in the shortest periods of time*
Original document.
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